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CASES NOTED
BANKRUPTCY-ARRANGEMENTS-PRIORITY OF
RECEIVERS' LOANS
Receivers appointed under a voluntary petition for an arrangement
in bankruptcy had their note for $5000 discounted by the bank pursuant
to a court order. On the adjudication of the debtor as bankrupt, the
bank filed a proof of claim averring priority over costs of administration.
Held, since authorization did not provide for any priority, the bank must
enter on a parity with other administration expense creditors. In re
Delaware Hosiery Mills, 202 F.2d 951 (3rd Cir, 1953).
The power to appoint a receiver, when a proper showing is made
is an inherent power of equity,' and apart from statute, the appointment
of a receiver is merely a provisional remedy, incidental and ancillary to
the primary object of the litigation and cannot of itself constitute the sole
or primary purpose of suit.2 The power of a court of equity to permit a
receiver to borrow money is implied from its inherent power to preserve
receivership accounts.3 A receiver is a ministerial officer of the court and
can exercise only the power and authority conferred upon him by the
court.' He must answer to the court. Property in the hands of a
receiver is in the custody of the court or as otherwise stated, is in custodia
legis, and persons dealing with the receiver must take notice of the extent
of his authority.6 The court will make the necessary orders as the exigencies
of the situation require.7 It is the general rule of the federal courts that
receivers have very limited powers, and in the absence of special authoriza-
tion are without power to borrow money, much less to pledge or mortgage
the property they hold as security for the repayment of money that they
have borrowed without authority.8 If a receiver borrows money without
authorization, he may become personally liable for the loss. 9 The receiver
1. Bayview Homes Co. v. Sanders, 102 Fla. 516, 136 So. 234 (1931); Armour
Fertilizer Works v. First Nat. Bank of Brooksville, 87 Pa. 436, 100 So. 362 (1924),
Beard v. Viser, 86 Fla. 265, 97 So. 718 (1923).
2. Lewis v. Commonwealth Securities, 51 F. Stipp. 33 (D. Del. 1943).
3. Rand v. Merrimack River Savings Bank, 86 NH. 351, 168 Atl. 897 (1933).
4. Klages v. Freier, 225 Iowa 586, 281 N.W. 145 (1938); Harrison v. Brown,
222 N.C. 610, 24 S.E.2d 470 (1943).
5. Gilles v. Yarhrough, 224 S.W.2d 720 (Texas 1949).
6. Lesser and Son v. Seymour, 35 Cal.2d 494, 218 P.2d 536 (1950); Knicker-
bocker Trust Co. v. Green Bay Phosphate Co., 62 Fla. 519, 56 So. 699 (1911); Baker
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 221 Ind. 411, 48 N.E.2d 173 (1943).
7. Marmor Ins. Agency v. Ardery, 240 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1951).
8. Real Estate-Land Title and Trust Co. v. Commonwealth Bond Corp., 63 F.2d
237 (2nd Cir. 1933); Darling v. Cornstalk Products Co., 54 F.2d 670 (E.D. 11. 1931);
Byrnes v. Missouri Nat. Bank, 7 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1925).
9. Naslund v. Moon Motor Car Co., 345 Mo. 465, 134 S.W.2d 102 (1939);
Riches v. Hadlock, 80 Utah 265, 15 P.2d 283 (1932).
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generally has no implied power to borrow money.10 However, an early
case held that by granting the receiver the power to continue the business,
he was impliedly given the power to incur debts, and borrow money for
urgent necessities. 1' The New York Court of Appeals has held that a
court of equity may authorize the borrowing of money in order to continue
the business that is held in receivership and it may expressly state that debts
thusly created shall have' priority over a pre-existing mortgage. 12 Without
authority, the receiver clearly has no right to borrow money and thereby
bind the estate.' 3 The Bankruptcy Act,' 4 provides that such loans may
have priority over existing obligations, if in the particular case, the equities
demand it, but this special authorization must be shown in the court
order. It will not be implied. The controversial point in the instant
case is one which is actually well settled, and was succintly expressed in
the case of Shipe v. Consumers Service Co.,' 5 which states that such claims
are not entitled to preferred treatment unless the court, by an appropriate
order, has given them preferred status. To obtain this priority, creditors
must go before the court, prior to the loan transaction, and secure the
proper order of priority, otherwise their claims are in no different position
than those of other general creditors.
In the instant case, :the court allows no latitude for the bank's error
in failing to require an express provision for priority over other costs of
administration in the order of the district court which they accepted.
Rather, they strictly adhere to the rule which requires averring of priority
in order to receive priority, and if otherwise, the loan will be treated merely
as another expense of administration.
It is this writer's conclusion that although the rule is well settled,
inequities will result, as in the instant case, so long as those dealing with
this situation rest complacently on a court order, without first determining
whether that order provides for the desired priority.
Thomas M. Coker, Jr.
10. Blanke v. Blanke Tea and Coffee Co., 124 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. 1939).
11. In re Erie Lumber Co., 150 Fed. 817 (S.D. Ga. 1906).
12. Vilas v. Page, 106 N.Y. 439, 13 N.E. 743 (1887) (railroad executed first
and second mortgages on its property which was later placed in the hands of a receiver
who petitioned court for power to buy necessary rolling stock on credit).
13. Union Trust Co. v. Illinois Midland Ry., 117 U.S. 434 (1886); In re
American Coller Co., 125 F.2d 496 (2nd Cir. 1942); Amick v. Ilotz, 101 F.2d 311
Sth Cir. 19391, cet. denied, 307 U.S. 637 (1939); Darling v. Cornstalk Products
Co., 54 F.2d 670 (E.D. I11. 1931); Byrnes v. Missouri Nat. Bank, 7 F.2d 978 (8th
Cir. 19259.
1 4. BANKIUWcY ACT, Art. 6 § 344, 11 U.S.C. 744.
15. 28 F.2d 53 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd, 29 F.2d 321 (7th Cir. 1928), cert. denied,
279 U.S. 850 (1929) (Petitioner sold supplies to the receiver to maintain the operation
of service stations, and claims expenses of operation, including supplies furnished should
be preferred. Court held such expenses can be given priority but only with extreme
caution. Receiver's purchase of supplies is notice of insolvent estate, and to gain
preference seller must see that court is advised of the purchase and preference given
in advance).
